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POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND FEDERAL
USURPATION OF THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE COMING
PREEMPTION OF THE MARTIN ACT
Jonathan R. Macey*
INTRODUCTION
This Article is about the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as a political entity. The basic story is that the SEC, like other
administrative agencies, is a creature of the political system, and, as
such, responds in varying ways to political pressure. From this starting
point, I observe that the SEC is no exception among regulatory agen-
cies in having a keen interest in maximizing its own power and pres-
tige. As such, the SEC is responsive to political pressures.
While the term "bureaucracy" is often associated with notions of
inefficiency, "[i]n the economics literature, the term 'bureaucracy' is
associated with ex ante optimal constraints" on agents such as employ-
ees and political actors.1 Following the economics paradigm, I model
the SEC as an administrative agency that maximizes its own agenda
subject to constraints from the political process. The SEC wants to
maximize, among other things, the size of its budget and the scope of
its jurisdictional power. In order to do so, it must cater to the whims
of the congressional agencies that are responsible for its budget. For
example, in the fall of 2000, the SEC, under then Chairman Arthur
Levitt, tried to address the issue of accounting firms' conflicts of inter-
est, particularly in the simultaneous delivery of accounting services
and audit services to the same client. In response, Representative Billy
Tauzin (R-La.), the Chairman of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, "actively went to bat for Andersen" to deter the Com-
mission in its support for legislation that would have restricted audi-
* Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities
Law, Yale Law School.
1 Walter Novaes & Luigi Zingales, Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Informa-
tion, 35 RAND J. ECON. 245, 257 (2004).
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tors from selling consulting services to their clients. 2 When Levitt
expressed his view that a conflict-of-interest potential existed for any
accountant or accounting firm that provided both consulting and au-
diting to the same company, Tauzin sent him a four-page letter that
was subsequently described as a "not very veiled threat" to attack Lev-
itt's own credibility. 3 In that year, Tauzin received $10,000 in contri-
butions from Andersen, and he received a total of $57,000 from
Andersen before the firm's indictment and collapse in 2002.
4
The SEC is under acute political pressure, and has been for sev-
eral years. The political pressure stems from two sources. First, the
wave of major corporate scandals and collapses involving SEC-regu-
lated public companies (e.g., Adelphia, Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Global Crossing) and financial intermediaries and banks (e.g., Salo-
mon Smith Barney, Credit Suisse First Boston, Janus, FMC, Strong)
has caused people to wonder what the SEC has been doing, and why
so much has gone wrong on its particular patch of regulatory turf.
Second, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has launched
what I have described elsewhere as a "hostile takeover" of the SEC. 5
The New York AG (which, in this context, stands for both "Attorney
General" and "Aspiring Governor") has made a name for himself not
only by vigorously pursuing corporate wrongdoing that the SEC ap-
pears to have been slow in pursuing, but also by loudly claiming to be
doing the job that the Commission was supposed to be doing, only
better, and with fewer people. It is in this way that Mr. Spitzer is stak-
ing his claim to being qualified for higher office.
This Article begins with a description of the political theory on
which it is based. In the following section are some illustrations of
how outside political pressure has affected the SEC. The final section
contains my prediction for the new regulatory equilibrium that we will
observe after Mr. Spitzer's departure from the domain of hands-on
securities regulation.
I. POSITIE POLITICAL THEORY
Positive Political Theory (PPT) models of agency policymaking
have explained, among other things, the tools that politicians can use
2 Gary Boulard, Follow the Money, THE TIMES OF AcADIANA (Lafayette, La.), Aug.




5 Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 128-33 (2005).
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to control or influence agency decisions. 6 These models differ sharply
from earlier models in political science that depicted the delegation
of decisionmaking authority to agencies by politicians as reflecting a
cessation of power by the political branches of government.
7 PPT has
shown that politicians use the tools of ex post and ex ante control to
overcome some of the agency problems associated with delegation
(such as the inability to foresee the issues the agency will face). One
way in which politicians can monitor and control administrative agen-
cies is by structuring them in such a way that "capture" by certain in-
terest groups is likely. The committee system represents another
mechanism that Congress uses to control administrative agencies.
Members of Congress are responsive to politically powerful interests
within their districts. Empirical studies have shown that representa-
tives of particular interests gain representation on certain congres-
sional committees. Committees are composed of members who are
significantly above-average supporters of particular interests.
8 And
these committees, in turn, exert varying degrees of control over the
agencies that report to them. This leads to agency responsiveness to
political considerations.
The SEC, for example, rarely deals with national banks when
compared with the Comptroller of the Currency, whose only constitu-
ency is national banks. Thus, the Comptroller is far more likely to be
captured by national banks, but the SEC is not likely to be so cap-
tured. By contrast, the SEC deals with investment bankers and their
lawyers on a regular basis. Members of the securities bar constitute
the SEC. The SEC reflects the interests of these constituencies.
While PPT models of political control do a good job of illustrat-
ing how and why politicians try to influence agency policymaking, it is
possible to overstate politicians' ability to do so. After all, there is con-
siderable distance between members of Congress, and even congres-
sional committees, and the work that goes on in agencies day-to-day.
This gives administrative agencies some freedom in which to operate,
subject to the concerns that their congressional oversight committee
will respond negatively if they do anything that offends the commit-
tee's interests. Negative responses range from reducing funding to
6 McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 180, 182 (1999).
7 David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Posi-
tive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALEJ. ON REG. 407, 407 (1997).
8 Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress;
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 151
(1988).
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insisting on personnel changes or organizational changes that reduce
the power and prestige of the agency.
Using a model first developed by Brian Marks, 9 the basic idea,
represented in Figure 1, is that at an original point in time, the admin-
istrative agency or court (in this case, the SEC) has been delegated the
authority to make decisions. There is an extant status quo, and the
enacting legislature, of course, has preferences about how they want
the regulation or law to be interpreted and applied. Within the legis-
lature, the House and the Senate, along with the relevant congres-
sional oversight committees, also have preferences, but these
preferences are heterogeneous.
The administrative agency has room to maneuver in this model.
The agency can pick a response that will not trigger a congressional
response, as long as the response is within a certain range of out-
comes, because congressional intervention is costly. Since the two
houses of Congress must agree to overturn a particular statute, bicam-
eralism provides agencies and courts with "a range of choices they can
make without fear of legislative reaction."' 0
Moreover, the congressional committee system delegates the au-
thority to oversee a specific, substantive policy area to a particular,
specialized subset of its members. Among the more well-established
principles of PPT is that committees serve the role of insulating the
effects of shifting legislative majorities by providing continuity, since
committee members are more likely to share the interests of the origi-
nal enacting Congress. Even if the original Congress changes compo-
sition, and hence point of view over time, it will be unable to affect
policy change unless the relevant committee changes its views, be-
cause the committee will control the critical question of whether, and
in what form, new legislation in a particular substantive policy area is
introduced onto the floor of the House as legislation. 1
This, in turn, provides the agency with additional room to ma-
neuver, because in order for the agency's interpretation to be over-
9 Brian Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policymaking:
Grove City College v. Bell (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington Univer-
sity, St. Louis) (on file with the Hoover Institute, Stanford University).
10 John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation,
12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 267 (1992).
11 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 18 (explaining that "[i]n
each chamber of Congress, at least one subcommittee and one full committee have
gatekeeping rights in that a bill normally will not be considered by the entire legisla-
tive body until it has been approved in committee"). For a general overview of Posi-
tive Political Theory, see generally WILLIAM H. RiKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN
INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1973).
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turned by Congress, it must not only upset the relevant congressional
committee sufficiently to provoke new legislation, it must also lie
outside the range of acceptable behavior to obtain passage in the
House and Senate, either with or without a presidential veto.
On the other hand, if the agency were to pick some response
outside of the interval of disagreement between the Congress and the
relevant committee, the decision would be overturned by new legisla-
tion, because both the House and the Senate would prefer new legisla-
tion to the policies being pursued by the agency. Thus the distance
between H #1 and C #1 and between H #2 and C #2 in Figure 1 shows
the set of politically viable options at particular points in time, where
"H" represents the perspective of the median legislative voter (House
and Senate), and "C" represents the perspective of the relevant over-
sight committees. The wider the divergence between the SEC and the
various "veto points" in the legislative process, the more freedom the
SEC will have.
Because the SEC must appeal to Congress and to its oversight
committees in a variety of ways, when Congress's point of view shifts,
the SEC's point of view must shift as well, or else it will provoke new
legislation. This is true regardless of the content of the original enact-
ing legislation that the SEC is interpreting, and regardless of the per-
sonal preferences of the SEC or the staff. Failure to respond to the
new equilibrium simply will provoke new legislation.
Of course, one of the things that the agency will take into account
when determining what course of action to take is its concern for its
own relationship with Congress, particularly in light of Congress's
control over the agency's budget. Hence, following Ferejohn and We-
ingast, I model the relevant government agent (here the SEC) as be-
ing largely unshackled from textual constraints
12 and free to interpret
the statutes they are applying quite liberally. However, budgetary con-
cerns are not the agency's only priority, particularly since Congress
can affect only the budget of the agency, and not the salary of individ-
uals within the agency. Nevertheless, agencies are not indifferent to
12 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
signaled the appellate courts to give more discretion to administrative agencies in
statutory interpretation. However, where there is a significant variance between the
courts' views and those of the administrative agency, the agency will have to modify its
views to account for the possibility of judicial nullification. See Linda R. Cohen &
Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994,
at 65, 65; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the
Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 165, 165 (1992). Of course, the courts must be worried about the legislature
re-instating the administrative agency's point of view.
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the preferences of Congress, particularly to the preferences of the rel-
evant congressional oversight committee, because they care about
their budget, and they care about possible congressional incursions
into their jurisdictional turf, which will happen where Congress nar-
rows the grant of administrative authority to an agency or grants ad-
ministrative authority to a rival agency, such as the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.
FIGuRE 1. POLITICALLY VIABLE POLICY INTERPRETATIONS FOR THE













Range of Regulatory Discretion for the
SEC Post-Spitzer
II. ENRON, ELIOT SPITZER, AND THE MARTIN ACT: EXOGENOUS
SHOCKS TO THE SEC's PEACEFUL DOMINANCE
OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS
As is the case in markets generally, the level of regulation (quan-
tity of output) that we observe at any particular point in time repre-
sents a particular equilibrium among competing interests. And, like
other markets, political markets are subject to exogenous shocks, and
also to the revolutionary effects of entrepreneurial activity by ambi-
tious politician-bureaucrats. The SEC has been buffeted by both in
abundance.
The meltdown of major public corporations subject to the SEC's
annual and periodic reporting requirements represents an exogenous
shock. The entrance onto the national political scene of a provincial
regulator, New York's Attorney General, reflects the height of political
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entrepreneurship. 13 The recent scandals concerning market timing
and late trading in the mutual fund industry, the spinning and ladder-
ing issues in the market for Initial Public Offerings, and revelations
concerning conflicts of interest facing sell-side stock market analysts
reflect a combination of exogenous shock and political entrepreneur-
ship. These are all areas in which Mr. Spitzer initiated enforcement
actions and other sorts of litigation in order to regulate U.S. capital
markets, the SEC's core policy area. Acting as a classic political entre-
preneur, Mr. Spitzer caused the exogenous shock by exposing these
issues and making them politically salient, much to the embarrass-
ment and discomfort of the SEC.
The disequilibrium created a window of opportunity for the for-
mulation of new regulation. Within two weeks after Mr. Spitzer
reached a settlement with Merrill Lynch regarding analyst conflicts of
interest, Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio), Chairman of the
House Committee on Financial Services, wrote a letter to the New York
Times observing that
[w] hat we are witnessing is nothing less than a regulatory coup that
would usurp the proper role of the S.E.C. [sic] and the self-regula-
tory organizations. This could result in a disastrous balkanization of
oversight, meaning that every Wall Street firm would have to cut its
private deal with every state attorney general or face the potential
threat of fraud charges.
In this time of lagging investor confidence, policymaking
through litigation discussed in a closed conference room is not
healthy for the U.S. capital markets, and not good for investors.
14
In 2003, the issue of federal preemption of Mr. Spitzer's activities
emerged in the form of H.R. 2179, the proposed Securities Fraud De-
terrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003.15 The bill contained
additional enforcement powers for the SEC, but included provisions
flatly banning states from making any laws or reaching any settlement
the requirements of which "differ from or are in addition to the re-
quirements in those areas established by the [SEC] by a national se-
curities exchange or self-regulatory organization [SRO].
' ' 16 The
13 For another perspective on how the Attorney General views his role as securi-
ties regulator, see his website, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/investors/investors.html.
14 Michael G. Oxley, Letter to the Editor, Who Should Police the Financial Markets?,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at BU 11.
15 Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179,
108th Cong.
16 Tim Reason, Cheese It, the States!, CFO, Feb. 2004, at 53, 56 (explaining and
quoting H.R. 2179), available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3011459/c_3046605
?f=magazine.featured.
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provision was later dropped from the proposed bill. 17
While actual preemption has not yet become a reality, I predict
that it will. Mr. Spitzer himself has no reason to oppose it-after he
has left office-and it is unlikely that Mr. Spitzer's successor will be
powerful enough to stave off a major legislative effort. In congres-
sional testimony in June 2002 on the subject of analysts' conflicts of
interest, Mr. Spitzer said he agreed with the need for national stan-
dards and has always opposed what he called
"increased federalism-a belief that the federal government should
scale back its involvement in our nation's affairs." However, he ad-
ded, "Congress and the federal government cannot have it both
ways. If Congress and the executive branch decide to curtail federal
oversight of areas such as securities, they must recognize it is the
responsibility of state securities regulators like me to step in to pro-
tect the investing public."' 8
In this context it is important to observe that Mr. Spitzer did not
mount his initiative to regulate the securities markets (and along the
way to politically embarrass the SEC and the administration) until his
political party had lost control of the White House to the Republicans.
Increased federal regulation already has come in the form of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act19 and the new corporate governance rules re-
cently adopted by both the New York Stock Exchange 20 and Nasdaq
Stock Market. 21
One obvious question is why the SEC permitted such a regulatory
vacuum to develop. The SEC failed to pursue vigorously the various
problems in financial reporting by public companies, conflicts of in-
terest in investment banking, and agency problems in mutual funds.
This passivity on the part of the SEC was likely caused by the agency's
capture by the very special interests it was ostensibly regulating.22
However, it is also important to realize that this capture was only possi-
ble with the acquiescence of Congress and the relevant oversight com-
mittees that monitor the SEC and control its budget.
17 Phyllis Diamond, Controversial Preemption Provision Dropped from SEC Enforcement
Bill, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 384 (Mar. 1, 2004).
18 Reason, supra note 16, at 56 (quoting Mr. Spitzer's testimony).
19 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
20 See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Relating to Corporate Governance, Ex-
change Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003).
21 See id.
22 See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group For-
mation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 909, 922 (1994);John C.
Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction, LEGAL Arr., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 46, 49 (discussing the
SEC's passivity with regard to the mutual fund crisis).
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In other words, public policy crises, whether real or imagined,
provide an opportunity for entrepreneurial politicians and regulators
to break the typical logjams that make it difficult to pass new rules
during times of ordinary politics. In earlier work, I have argued that
Mr. Spitzer's response to this crisis was a natural and inevitable re-
sponse to the vacant policy space created by the SEC.
2 3 New York's
powerful Martin Act 24 was the lever with which Mr. Spitzer successfully
catapulted himself from a relatively obscure local political position to
national prominence.
Other states also have been entering this political market. In
2003, California enacted a new criminal securities statute, 25 and on
the day it went into effect, the California Attorney General announced
that he had launched an investigation of fees charged by mutual funds
doing business in the state. 26 A number of other states, including
23 Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations in U.S. Reg-
ulation of Corporations and Markets Post-Eliot Spitzer, Paper Prepared for the Sep-
tember, 2004 Conference on Changes of Governance in Europe, Japan, and the U.S.:
Corporations, State, Markets and Intermediaries, Max-Planck-Institut ffir auslandis-
ches und internationals Privatrecht & Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin (JDZB)
(Sept. 2004) (manuscript on file with author).
24 Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw art. 23-A (McKinney 1996). The Martin Act
.provides the regulatory framework governing the offer and sale of securities, com-
modities and other investment vehicles in and from New York." Orestes J. Mihaly &
David J. Kaufman, Securities, Commodities, and Other Investments, Supplementary Practice
Commentary, in N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw art. 23-A, at 10 (McKinney 1996); see People v.
Landes, 645 N.E.2d 716, 717 (N.Y. 1994); CPC Int'l v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d
116, 119 (N.Y. 1987). Remedial in nature, it was enacted "to prevent all kinds of fraud
in connection with the sale of securities and commodities and to defeat all unsubstan-
tial and visionary schemes in relation thereto whereby the public is fraudulently ex-
ploited." People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926); accord
People v. Lexington Sixty-First Assocs., 345 N.E.2d 307, 311 (N.Y. 1976); Dunham v.
Ottinger, 154 N.E. 298, 300 (N.Y. 1926). The Martin Act "seek[s] to regulate parties
selling securities and to advance the public's knowledge about the securities offered
for sale." Landes, 645 N.E.2d at 718. The terms "fraud" and "fraudulent practices"
under the Martin Act are
to be given a wide meaning so as to embrace all deceitful practices contrary
to the plain rules of common honesty, including all acts, even though not
originating in any actual evil design to perpetuate fraud or injury upon
others, which do tend to deceive or mislead the purchasing public.
Lexington Sixty-First Assocs., 345 N.E.2d at 311; see People v. Sala, 695 N.Y.S.2d 169, 177
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
25 Act of Sept. 9, 2003, 2003 Cal. Stat. 876.
26 See Press Release, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer, Attorney General
Lockyer Launches Investigation of Fraudulent Sales Practices by Mutual Funds (Jan.
2, 2004), available at www.ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/2004/04-OOI.htm.
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Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, have initiated ef-
forts to enact new state securities laws. 27
The Martin Act was passed in 1931. Its basic provision, as Profes-
sor Loss has observed, "has a majestic, one-sentence sweep." 28 When-
ever it appears to the Attorney General that, in connection with any
security (or commodity) or investment advice, that any person has
[e]mployed... or is about to employ any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of any false
pretense, representation or promise,.., or is about to employ, any
deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, fraud,
false pretense or false promise, or shall have engaged in or engages
in or is about to engage in any practice or transaction or course of
business relating to the purchase, exchange, investment advice or
sale of securities or commodities which is fraudulent or in violation
of the law and which has operated or which would operate as a
fraud upon the purchaser, . . . any one or all of which devices,
schemes, artifices, . . . deceptions .... false .. .practices, .. . and
courses of business are hereby declared to be and are hereinafter
referred to as a fraudulent practice or fraudulent practices[,] or he
believes . . .that an investigation [should] be made, he may in his
discretion either require or permit such person ... to file with him
a statement in writing under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and
circumstances concerning the subject matter which he believes it is
to the public interest to investigate. 29
Whenever the Attorney General believes "from evidence satisfac-
tory to him" that any person either is about to or has already engaged
(or is engaging) in fraudulent practices, the Attorney General may sue
to enjoin the practice, and may also sue to enjoin the defendant per-
manendy from selling securities in the state, and for other relief that
the Attorney General can convince the court is "proper."30 Refusal to
testify is prima facie proof of having engaged in fraudulent practices
for the purposes of obtaining a permanent injunction.3 ' And the At-
torney General also has the power to request a court to appoint a
receiver for "property derived [from] fraudulent practices," including
"commingled property."3 2
In People v. Federated Radio Corp., the New York Court of Appeals
clarified and perhaps even broadened the scope of the Martin Act,
27 Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law En-
forcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 952 (2004).
28 Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURTIEs REGULATION 13 (1983).
29 Id. at 13-14 (quoting the Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW art. 23-A, § 352).
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holding that "fraud" is defined as "all deceitful practices common to
the plain rules of common honesty. '33 Going further, the court
opined that the terms "fraud" and "fraudulent practice" are "given a
wide meaning, so as to include all acts, although not originating in
any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetuate fraud or injury
upon others, which do by their tendency to deceive or mislead the
purchasing public come within the purpose of the law."
' 34 In other
words, the term "fraud" in the Martin Act goes far beyond what the
common law defined as fraud.
35
Using the Martin Act as a lever, Mr. Spitzer was able to leverage
his relatively modest position in the world of securities regulation to
threaten the primacy of the SEC as the nation's primary regulator of
capital markets. Mr. Spitzer exploited the opportunity made available
by his ability to use the Martin Act, combined with the SEC's quies-
cence. However, as might be predicted, the SEC responded to the
challenge.
Consistent with insights of PPT, the aggressive prosecutorial ac-
tions taken by Mr. Spitzer created a new demand on the part of the
SEC's traditional constituency, the investment banking industry, for
aggressive SEC action. The demand for aggressive action by the SEC
was not a result of new regulatory fervor on the part of the SEC, but a
desire on the part of industry for the SEC to displace the Attorney
General and to regain its former position as the nation's primary se-
curities regulator.
Only when the SEC regains its position of primacy will industry be
in a position to accomplish its ultimate goal: preemption of state regu-
latory power in the domain of securities regulation. This Article uses
the power struggle between Mr. Spitzer and the SEC over corporate
governance and regulation of the securities industry to demonstrate
the point that the power to regulate,3 6 as well as the power to refrain
33 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926).
34 Id.
35 See id. at 658.
36 The notion of using regulation to benefit private parties rather than to serve
the public interest was first developed formally by the University of Chicago's George
Stigler, who modeled the regulatory process as a function of the government's ability
to benefit private parties by restricting entry into markets, policing cartels, and legiti-
mizing various price-fixing strategies. These devices, Stigler showed, make it possible
for private firms to galvanize into effective political coalitions and to earn super com-
petitive returns called economic rents. In a nutshell, Stigler showed how regulation
can benefit the regulated, rather than the public. According to Stigler, the market
for regulation consisted of providing value to politicians in the form of campaign
contributions, efforts to organize voting, intimations of future jobs, and occasional
outright bribes in return for favorable regulation. See generally George J. Stigler, The
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from regulating,37 and also to deregulate are sources of rents for gov-
ernmental actors and provide rent-seeking opportunities for interest
groups. Students of public policy and others interested in improving
the quality of regulation and policy formation should understand the
incentive structure under which policymakers and regulators operate.
The SEC's newfound regulatory fervor is the response to the new
political environment in which the agency has found itself. This is not
the first time that the SEC has been forced to respond to political
pressure. In the wake of Enron's collapse, at least three House com-
mittees (Financial Services, Energy and Commerce, and Education
and the Work Force), and no less than seven Senate committees (Gov-
ernmental Affairs; Judiciary; Health, Education, Labor and Pensions;
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation; Energy and Natural Resources; and Finance) were investi-
gating various aspects of the company's collapse, from the effect on
investors and financial markets to the effect on natural gas markets. A
central focus of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs was
whether agencies of the federal government, including the SEC,
could have done more to protect the enormous number of people
and businesses that were hurt when Enron imploded.38
In other words, as Enron and other corporate scandals became a
more salient political issue, the political-support-maximizing solution
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). Major research
advancing the "rent-seeking" (also known as the "public choice") approach to regula-
tion has been contributed by James Buchanan, Sam Peltzman, Robert Tollison and
Gordon Tullock. See generally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT (1962);James Buchanan, Rent-Seeking and Profit-Seeking, in TOWARD A THE-
ORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 1 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Rob-
ert D. Tollison, Is the Theory of Rent-Seeking Here to Stay?, in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC
CHOICE 143 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 1987); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legis-
lation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988); Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking, in THE NEW PALGRAVE:
THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 604 (John Eatweh et al. eds., 1991). Consistent with one
of the principal insights of this school of thought, this Article models politicians, bu-
reaucrats and others involved in the policymaking process as rational economic actors
who, subject to a variety of constraints, act in their own self-interest, rather than some
vaguely defined conception of the private interest.
37 See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT Ex-
TRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (describing rent extraction as payments
from industries to politicians to avoid regulation).
38 In particular, Senator Joe Lieber-man wanted to know whether cracks need to
be filled in the regulatory system-including at the SEC. See Press Release, Senate
Government Affairs Committee, Lieberman, Levin to Probe Enron Collapse (Jan. 2,
2002), available at http://govt-aff.senate.gov/010201 press.htm.
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for the SEC shifted from a benign, laissez-faire approach to market
regulation to a more energized, hands-on regulatory approach.
A. The Story of EDGAR
All public companies, foreign and domestic, whose securities are
issued or traded in the United States are now required to file registra-
tion statements, periodic reports, and other forms electronically
through EDGAR, the SEC's electronic filing system. 3
9 Access to ED-
GAR is free.
While the SEC proudly touts the availability and usefulness of ED-
GAR, this was not always the case. As Carl Malamud reported on a
first-hand basis in Mappa.Mundi magazine, the SEC had to be dragged
kicking and screaming into the internet age:
In the summer of 1993, I was helping my friends at Sun Microsys-
tems give a demonstration of the Internet to the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives. It was a typical Internet demonstration: we hauled a couple
hundred boxes of equipment into the U.S. Capitol, set it up over-
night, and did a bunch of "the future is here" show-and-tell. Live
video coming in from Russian satellites, cell phones hooked up to
the net, yadda, yadda, yadda. Everybody was suitably impressed.
After the demonstration, [House Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications and Finance] Chairman EdwardJ. Markey, came up to
me and wondered if I could look into something that was bugging
him. His subcommittee had responsibility not only for the telecom-
munications industry, but also for oversight of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. A bunch of Nader's Raiders had been send-
ing in petitions to the subcommittee asking why the SEC filings
weren't available on the Internet. The initial reaction from the SEC
was that the reason the data wasn't [sic] on the Internet was that it
was technically impossible, and that even if the data were available
the only people interested in SEC fillings were Wall Street Fatcats
and they didn't really need subsidized access to data they were will-
ing to pay for.
If something is technically impossible, I get interested. I
looked at the EDGAR system and decided it was worth taking a
crack at it. Our first cut at the problem was to try and work with the
SEC. Chairman Markey's Chief of Staff asked the SEC to come in
39 EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, per-
forms automated collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of sub-
missions by companies who are required by law to file forms with the SEC. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Important Information About EDGAR, at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/
aboutedgar.htm (last modified May 14, 2003).
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and discuss the idea of giving us the data and letting us put together
an Internet site. There was a bit of pushback, to say the least.
The problem was the 70's era data processing system that the
SEC had put in place in the late 80's. The deal was that EDGAR was
way too rough for consumers to digest. It needed, to speak the MIS
lingo of the time, "value-add." Who would add value? Well, the
SEC had cut a contract with a data wholesaler who would add value.
The wholesaler, in turn, would sell to information retailers who
would add even more value. Then, the information would be sold
on the retail information market to the Wall Street crowd who had
an interest in the data. Obviously, if we gave away all this informa-
tion on the Internet, it would subvert our entire Free Enterprise
System.
In that meeting with the SEC and the Chairman's staff, my fa-
vorite moment was when we got to the question of why in the world
people would want to see EDGAR data. I maintained that the In-
ternet was full of lots of people-students, journalists, senior citizen
investors-who were dying for access to this data. The SEC felt that
only a few people would want to see EDGAR documents, and be-
sides the Internet (or "the ARPANET" as they kept referring to it)
"didn't have the right kind of people."
Now, this was a cheap shot, and I understood that what they
meant was "there weren't a lot of people,just a few researchers," but
I couldn't resist.
"The right kind of people?" I said, rising up in my chair. "I
think the American people are the right kind of people."
So much for the idea of working cooperatively.
After a bit of politics and some grantsmanship, I secured a
small National Science Foundation grant, hit up my friends at Sun
for a couple of computers, and in January 1994 launched a free
EDGAR system on the Internet. The Retail Information Industry,
which was making several hundred million dollars per year selling
SEC filings, was not amused.
Brad Burdick of UUCOM (currently a full-time contractor
working with Invisible Worlds) and I ran the EDGAR site for 18
months. We started with basic FTP access to data. Just to prove that
our EDGAR site wasn't a cheap trick, we added the text of all U.S.
Patents. Then, we moved towards searchable indices, a web-based
front-end, and a variety of other components to make the site use-
ful. We built up a user base of 50,000 people a day, and these peo-
ple weren't just Wall Street Fatcats.
Our goal, however, wasn't to be in the database business. Our
goal was to have the SEC serve their own data on the Internet. After
we built up our user base, I decided it was time to force the issue.
That's when the fireworks began. When users visited our EDGAR
system in August 1995, they got an interesting message:
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This Service Will Terminate in 60 Days
Click Here For More Information
Click here they did! One of the lessons I've learned from
building Internet services is that when people get something for
free, they want their money's worth.
Just by coincidence, the SEC had scheduled an EDGAR Tech-
nology Conference for August 14, 1995. We weren't invited, natch,
but felt that it was a public meeting and it might be fun to attend.
The purpose of the conference was to look at the question of filing
EDGAR documents, not necessarily the question of disseminating
EDGAR documents, but I suspected that our announcement on the
Internet EDGAR service might skew the agenda.
I have to say that my faith in government was restored after this.
The commissioners of the SEC had clearly not been aware of the
issue, but there is nothing like pieces in the Wall StreetJournal and
15,000 messages to the Chairman to raise the profile of an issue.
We were called in to meet the commissioners and the Chief of Staff
to explain what it would take to run an EDGAR service. The new
head of MIS at the SEC, Mike Bartell, turned out to be a real live
wire and he volunteered to have the SEC run the service.
After a bit of checking with the congressional oversight com-
mittees, the SEC said they were ready to go. We loaded a couple of
computers in the back of a station wagon and drove down to SEC
headquarters and set them up a system. On October 1, the day we
had said we would terminate our service, the SEC was fully opera-
tional. Since then, they've embraced the EDGAR service on the In-
ternet and made considerable enhancements. It has proven to be
one of the largest U.S. government presences on the Internet and
the staff is 100% behind their role in providing valuable public dis-
closure to the investing public. I even got a nice thank-you letter
from the Chairman.
40
In other words, consistent with PPT, pressure from the relevant
subcommittee caused the SEC to respond. This ultimately led it to
abandon its allegiance to its traditional constituents, brokerage firms
who wanted to erect barriers to the dissemination of information for
as long as possible and the information wholesalers and re-packagers
with which it had contractual relations, and to respond with a regula-
tion in the public interest.
B. Regulation of the Mutual Fund Industry
Late trading and market timing were not only common practices,
but the existence of such practices was well known to the SEC, which
40 Carl Malamud, The Importance of Being EDGAR, MAPPAMUNDI, Sept. 15, 1999, at
http://mappa.mundi.net/cartography/EDGAR/index.html.
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acquiesced in such practices until Mr. Spitzer came along to change
the political climate. As Eric Zitzewitz has observed, the possibility
that mutual funds could use pricing policies that permitted market
timers and late traders to earn large trading profits at the expense of
long-term shareholders was understood by the industry for twenty
years and heavily exploited since the late 1990s. 4 1
Because open-end mutual funds price their shares using the net
asset value (NAV) calculated at the end of the business day (usually
4:00 p.m. Eastern time), investors can make riskless arbitrage profits
by trading based on more recent market movements that are not re-
flected in the stale closing prices:
[I]f the U.S. market has risen since the close of overseas equity mar-
kets, investors can expect that overseas equity markets will open
higher the following market. Investors can buy a fund with a stale-
price NAV for less than its current value, and they can likewise sell a
fund for more than its current value on a day that the U.S. market
has fallen. Analogous opportunities exist when the values of infre-
quently or illiquidly traded domestic assets have recently changed. 4 2
Zitzewitz shows that arbitrageurs buying international funds on
days the S&P 500 goes up and selling international funds on days the
S&P goes down can generate returns of thirty-five percent to seventy
percent a year, far better than the returns from investing in the funds
themselves. 43 Smaller but statistically significant arbitrage returns are
also possible by investing in other funds, including small-cap funds,
convertible bond funds, high-yield bond funds, and similar funds that
are thinly traded and illiquid.44 Moreover, these abnormal returns
earned by sophisticated investors can come at the expense of long-
term fund shareholders.
Mutual funds companies could, if they were so inclined, impose
internal trading rules that mitigated or eliminated the capacity of
traders to engage in stale-price arbitrage by imposing transaction fees,
monitoring excess trading, or adopting so-called "fair-value pricing" in
which NAVs are calculated in real time, either continuously or fre-
quently, using current market prices from the latest trades.
However, prior to the efforts of Mr. Spitzer, the SEC was reluctant
to intervene on behalf of investors because "[t]he SEC normally
avoids being overly proscriptive, preferring to allow the industry the
41 Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds, 19
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 245, 245 (2003).
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latitude to develop innovative ways of addressing [its] concerns. In
this case, however, many fund companies appear to be abusing that
latitude to essentially not respond to the SEC's concerns about share-
holder dilution."
45
It has been reported that the late trading and market timing
abuses in the mutual fund industry took place from June 2002 to Sep-
tember 2003, "when New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer first
sued companies involved in widespread fund trading abuses," accord-
ing to the SEC itself.46 The SEC, starting in late 2003, finally began to
take an interest in abuses of mutual funds. It is hardly likely that the
SEC's neglect of the problems in the mutual fund industry would have
ended so suddenly without the pressure exerted by the New York At-
torney General's interest in the issue.
C. Analyst Conflicts of Interest
Mr. Spitzer actually entered the world of securities regulation
with his investigation of conflicts of interest. Starting with Citigroup
and its star analystJack Grubman, Mr. Spitzer's investigation soon ex-
panded to cover virtually every Wall Street brokerage company, in-
cluding: Goldman Sachs Group; Credit Suisse First Boston (a unit of
Credit Suisse Group); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.; the UBS
Paine Webber division of UBS AG; the Salomon Smith Barney unit of
Citigroup, Inc.; and Bear, Stearns, & Co.
As reported in Financial Advisor magazine, when asked why New
York's Mr. Spitzer rather than the SEC uncovered this and other scan-
dals, former SEC chair Arthur Levitt candidly observed that
[t] here were issues on which [the SEC] "couldn't seem to move,"
like the accounting and Wall Street analyst scandals. "I knew about
this problem [conflicts of interest in Wall Street analysts' research]
from running a brokerage," Levitt said. "And the accountants paid
millions to seven lobbying firms to tie us up. We couldn't galvanize
public, media and congressional support on this."
47
Levitt also was clear on the impact that Mr. Spitzer had on the
regulatory process: "Once Enron, Arthur Andersen and WorldCom
happened, Mr. Spitzer made creative use of the Martin Act in New
45 Id. at 274.
46 Siobhan Hughes, SEC SuesJB Oxford, Clearing Arm, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2004, at
D7.
47 Levitt Disavows Brokers' RIA Exemption, FIN. ADVISOR, Mar. 2004, at 25, 25, avail-
able at http://www.financialadvisormagazine.com/articles/march_2004_frontline.
html.
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York state" to get involved in the regulatory process.48 Thus, as with
the more recent mutual fund crisis, the existence of analyst conflicts
of interest was well known within the SEC. The SEC, however, did
nothing to safeguard the interests of the investing public until Mr.
Spitzer came along. This observation is not new. What is new is the
point that the SEC was acting rationally: lacking the political support
in Congress for a more active regulatory agenda, the SEC did not have
the authority to police the capital markets more vigorously.
Evidence that the SEC has pursued what is, from its own interest,
a rational strategy is apparent from looking at the growth in the SEC's
budget since the financial scandals began. The SEC enjoyed the larg-
est budget increase of any U.S. administrative agency between 2002
and 2003, and the largest increase in memory for the agency.49 Tell-
ingly, these huge budget increases were strongly supported by the In-
vestment Company Institute (ICI) 5 0 and the Securities Industry
Association (SIA) ,51 the leading interest groups representing, respec-
tively, mutual funds and the securities industry. Stunningly, the SEC's
budget more than doubled during the period 2001-2004, increasing
from $422,800,000 to $913,000,000 during that period.
In 2001 SEC staff also garnered the largest pay increases of any
agency, as Congress implemented the Pay Parity Act. The newly
renamed House Financial Services Committee voted to increase the
SEC's pay at its first markup session, moving SEC employees to the
same pay scale as employees of the Federal Reserve Board and the
Comptroller of the Currency. 52
48 Id.
49 See Table 1 infra p. 969 and note 53.
50 Press Release, Investment Company Institute, ICI Supports Bush SEC Budget
Proposal (Jan. 6, 2003), at http://www.ici.org/statements/nr/2O03/O3-news-sec
budget.html.
51 Press Release, Securities Industry Association, SIA Supports President's Effort
to Increase SEC's Budget: Well-Funded Regulator Is Key to Building Public Trust and
Confidence in Capital Markets (Feb. 4, 2003), at http://www.sia.com/press/2003-
press.releases/html/prsec budget.html.
52 Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief (Pay Parity) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-123,
115 Stat. 2390 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (West Supp. 2004)); see also SEC.
& EXCH. COMM., PAY PARITY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND REPORT (2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/payparity.htm (describing the SEC's approach to
implementing the new compensation plan).
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TABLE 1. SEC BUDGET HISTORY VS. ACTUAL EXPENSES BUDGET





Fiscal Year Budget Authority Actual Obligations Previous Year
1990 166,633 165,211 -
1991 189,083 187,689 13%
1992 225,792 224,281 19%
1993 253,235 251,871 12%
1994 269,150 266,249 6%
1995 300,437 284,755 12%
1996 300,921 296,533 0%
1997 311,100 308,591 3.4%
1998 315,000 311,143 1.3%
1999 341,574 338,887 8%
2000 377,000 369,825 10%
2001 422,800 412,618 12%
2002 513,989 487,345 22%
2003 716,350 619,321 39%
2004 811,500 - 13%
2005 913,000 13%
Notes:
(1) Actuals from Congressional Justification
(2) Excludes SAM
D. Soft Dollar Commissions
Clearly the most interesting regulatory issue currently facing the U.S.
capital markets are proposals to restrict what are known as "soft dollar
commissions," in which institutional investors, particularly mutual
funds, pay for research and other services by directing stock trades at
full commission to the firms providing such research. The many crit-
ics of soft dollar commissions say that the practice is not transparent,
and it results in above-market commissions that reduce profits for
53 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Frequently Requested FOIA Document: SEC Budget History vs.
Actual Expenses, at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/budgetact.htm (last modified Apr.
4, 2003) (utilizing available data and calculating percentage increases).
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fund investors.54 Critics also claim that the practice of paying soft dol-
lars for research permits mutual funds to breach their fiduciary duties
to investors by enabling funds artificially to inflate profits by forcing
investors to pay fees for research that fund managers are supposed to
be doing with the money that investors already are paying in manage-
ment fees and other fund expenses.55 As some investors have posed
the question: "If managers are already being paid an advisory fee, why
should they be permitted to dip into client funds to pay for research
they use in connection with managing client portfolios-even if the
research may benefit clients?
'5 6
Supporters of soft dollar commissions argue that the mutual fund
industry, led by the ICI, is engaged in a political campaign "to put
America's best securities analysts out of business."57 Supporters of the
practice of paying soft dollar commissions point out that the analysts
able to earn such commissions are top analysts on Wall Street, "not the
lavishly compensated-and vastly overrated-superstars who work for
the big Wall Street investment banks. '5 8 Rather, these analysts offer
valuable information precisely because "their firms don't have any
conflicted investment-banking relationships with the companies they
cover. So these analysts don't have permanent Buy ratings on every
stock."'59 In particular, defenders of soft dollar commissions assert
that independent analysts, whose firms don't engage in underwriting,
are more independent and hence more likely to be candid in their
views of what companies to invest in.
60
Those opposed to regulating or eliminating soft dollar commis-
sions, including groups like Buyside that represent institutional inves-
tors, cite numerous examples of how soft dollar commissions have
produced great results for investors. 61 Mark Roberts, of Off Wall
Street Consulting Group, was the only analyst to have had a Sell rating
on Enron as early as May 2001, well before the bottom fell out.6 2
Howard Schilit of the Center for Financial Research and Analysis
54 The Benchmark Cos., 2003: A Year of Awakening, at http://www.benchmark
alert.com/library/alerts/121603.html (last modified Dec. 17, 2003).
55 Id.
56 Id.





61 See Ben Mattlin, Getting Tough on Soft Dollars: The SEC's Latest Target Could Have
Sweeping Repercussions for Both Sides of the Street, BUYSIDE, June 2004, at 58, 58-60, availa-
ble at http://www.buyside.com/archives/2004/0406/html/0406sdlr.asp.
62 Luskin, supra note 57.
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warned about Microstrategy in October 1999, before the stock fell by
ninety-five percent in one of the first in the latest wave of corporate
scandals, and, more recently, the accounting problems at Biovail
before the stock fell nearly fifty percent. David Tice of Behind the
Numbers pointed out problems at Tyco International in October
1999, Lucent Technologies in November 1999, and Providian Finan-
cial in July 2001, "all major train wrecks that Wall Street blithely ig-
nored until it was too late."'6 3 Scott Cleland of Precursor reportedly
called WorldCom's business a "dead model walking" in January 2002,
and predicted the company's bankruptcy.6 4 In 2000, Cleland warned
investors against Global Crossing, Qwest Communications and Level 3
Communications because his research exposed the myth of hyper-
growth in Internet traffic, showing that actual growth was only about
one-fifteenth as fast as these companies were claiming.
65
Soft dollar commissions emerged after the SEC was compelled
finally to stop the legalized price-fixing of trading commissions. Price-
fixing took the form of setting trading commissions at a fixed rate
($0.75 per share at the time commission prices were deregulated in
May 1975).66 As with airlines, when prices were fixed, brokers com-
peted for investor clients by offering additional goods and services.
Commission deregulation led to much lower prices. Commissions are
currently $0.06 per share traded-a ninety-two percent decrease.
67
In response to complaints that brokerage commissions had sunk
so low that brokers could no longer afford to pay analysts, analysts
became more involved in marketing IPOs in order to justify their re-
tention by investment banks. Soft dollar commissions were thought to
be illegal because fund managers' fiduciary duties to investors obli-
gated them to find the lowest commission rates for their clients. In
response to industry pressure, in 1975, as part of its National Market
System legislation, Congress created a new "safe harbor" provision
under section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that spe-
cifically allowed mutual fund investment advisors to pay higher com-
missions if the advisors thought that such higher commissions were in
the interests of the fund.68 In other words, "' [in] oney managers pre-
vailed upon Congress to insert legal protections specifically to allow




66 Mattlin, supra note 61.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. (quoting Edwin Laurenson, Baker & McKenzie, New York).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
From a public choice perspective, the question is why the SEC has
not regulated soft dollar brokerage as it has responded in the cases of
EDGAR and mutual fund time-zone arbitrage, and late-trading. In my
view, the SEC will respond, but it will do so only when it becomes clear
that Mr. Spitzer will do nothing. In other words, absent Mr. Spitzer,
the political-support-maximizing solution for the SEC would be to do
nothing. We know this because Congress specifically empowered
firms to pay such commissions in 1975 and has given no indication
that it has changed its point of view.
The SEC will change when, and only when, it is forced to change,
and it will follow Congress's lead when it finally does.
III. THE FUTURE
It is tempting to think the world will look tomorrow much the
same as it looks today. The Martin Act, and hence the possibility of
vigorous state regulation of the securities markets by the New York
Attorney General, has been around for a long time. But that does not
mean that it will be around forever. The SEC and Congress enjoyed a
monopoly on power for several decades after the Securities Acts were
passed in the 1930s. There is no reason to think that they would not
prefer to revert to this condition as soon as possible.
The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and the dramatic increases in the
SEC's budget in the recent past, despite its dismal performance polic-
ing the nation's securities markets provides some evidence that Con-
gress wants the SEC to retain its stature at the epicenter of the
nation's capital markets. However, budget increases and Sarbanes-
Oxley alone are not going to accomplish this goal. Preemption of the
Martin Act will be required.
CONCLUSION
Whatever else we might think of regulatory agencies, they are po-
litical in nature. This is true of the Commerce Department, and it
also is true of the Securities and Exchange Commission. A positive,
i.e., descriptive, theory of the administrative process assumes that bu-
reaucracies, including the SEC, are an important vehicle through
which interest groups sustain and even extend the political victories
they have won in Congress. This Article looks at the current regula-
tory crisis in the U.S. capital market from the allied perspectives of
PPT and federalism in order to make two points about the current
regulatory environment. First, I observe that the recent history of
scandals, followed closely by new regulation, illustrates the impor-
tance of utilizing opportunities created by crisis. Crisis, in this case
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manifested in the sudden collapse of Enron Corporation, followed
closely by WorldCom and a spate of other highly salient corporate
frauds (Adelphia, Global Crossing, Tyco), created the "policy window"
through which political entrepreneurs could launch their initiatives.
Moreover, the regulation that we observe at a particular juncture in
time is not permanently in place. As political pressures change, as a
result of exogenous events and technological change, so too will
regulation.
The various governmental responses to the crises reflect the na-
ture of the ongoing jurisdictional competition between and among
state regulators and federal regulators in the U.S. federal system.
State regulators, most notably New York's Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, moved decisively to fill what they viewed as a regulatory vac-
uum created by the SEC. The SEC and its congressional monitors
have been forced to respond to this new competition. The long-run
consequences of this competition, while far from clear, are likely to
lead to a congressional counterattack in the form of preemption of
New York's Martin Act. The capital markets will be weaker if this
occurs.
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